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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  
     ew international humanitarian law topics are proving as problematic in 
modern warfare as “classification of conflict,” that is, the identification of 
the type of conflict to which particular hostilities amount as a matter of 
law.1 Classifying the conflict in question is always the first step in any inter-
national humanitarian law analysis, for the nature of the conflict determines 
the applicable legal regime. Accordingly, classification is a subject of semi-
nal importance.  
The current difficulties derive from the advent of hostilities over the 
past two decades that do not neatly fit the traditional bifurcation of conflict 
                                                                                                                      
* Chairman, International Law Department, U.S. Naval War College. A previous ver-
sion of this paper was published in 17 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 245 
(2012). The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the views and opinions of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy or 
Dept. of Defense. 
1. For a comprehensive survey of the subject, including case studies, see INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICT (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2011). 
The work is the culmination of a two-year Chatham House-sponsored project involving a 
group of international experts. This article has benefitted from participation in that pro-
cess and the author is grateful to his colleagues for their insights. 
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into either State-on-State or purely internal. For instance, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) struggled with criteria 
for internationalization of non-international conflict in its first case, Tadić.2 
Less than a decade later, transnational terrorism refocused attention on 
classification issues. Was such terrorism international in character because 
it transcended borders or non-international because it did not involve the 
forces of one State engaging in hostilities against those of another (or was it 
even armed conflict at all)?3 More recently, external recognition of the Na-
tional Transitional Council as the legitimate government of Libya raised the 
question of whether such recognition “de-internationalized” the conflict 
between the States that were fighting on the side of the rebels and Qadda-
fi’s forces.4 
In the future, cyber warfare will further complicate classification. Cyber 
operations have the potential for producing vast societal and economic dis-
ruption without causing the physical damage typically associated with 
armed conflict. They are also inherently transborder, thereby frustrating 
any approach to classification based on geographical factors. Moreover, 
massive attacks can be launched by a single individual or by a group that is 
organized entirely on-line. This is in sharp contrast to traditional warfare, 
which depends on either the involvement of a State’s armed forces or that 
of a group capable of mounting typical military operations.  
                                                                                                                      
2. Prosecutor v. Tadić; Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on Defence Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 76 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 
1995) [hereinafter Tadić Decision on Defence Motion]. The seminal article on interna-
tionalization is Hans-Peter Gasser, Internationalized Non-International Armed Conflicts: Case 
Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon, 33 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 145 
(1983). See also Christopher Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and the Tadić Case, 7 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 265 (1996); Theodor Meron, Classification 
of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua’s Fallout, 92 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 236 (1998).  
3. For conflicting views on this subject, see HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against 
Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel 2006(2) PD 459 [2006] (Isr.), reprinted in 46 IN-
TERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 373 (2007), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_ 
eng/02/690/007/a34/02007690.a34.pdf; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
4. Clearly, the conflict between NATO (and other) forces and the Libyan security ap-
paratus was international in character. The question is whether the recognition of the re-
bels (National Transitional Council) meant that NATO forces were now fighting on the 
side of the government against dissident armed forces (the remnants of the Libyan armed 
forces still loyal to Qaddafi) such that the conflict became non-international. On the 
recognition of the National transitional Council, see Stefan Talmon, Recognition of the Libyan 
National Transitional Council, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INSIGHTS (June 
16, 2011), http//www.asil.org/ insights110616.cfm. 
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This article explores these and other classification of cyber conflict is-
sues.5 Two caveats are in order. First, the occurrence of cyber operations in 
no way alters the classification of an ongoing kinetic conflict. The paradig-
matic example is the cyber operations conducted by “patriotic hackers” 
during the 2008 international armed conflict between Georgia and Russia.6 
Second, this article will not consider the possible emergence of new catego-
ries of armed conflict, such as “transnational armed conflict.”7 Rather it 
adopts a conventional approach, one acknowledging two basic genre of 
conflict—international and non-international. To the extent cyber opera-
tions bear of classification, they do so within this generally accepted 
framework. 
 
II. THE BASIC TYPOLOGY 
 
The modern era of conflict classification began in 1949 with adoption of 
the four Geneva Conventions.8 Earlier treaties governing hostilities had 
                                                                                                                      
5. On classification more generally, see Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed Conflicts in Inter-
national Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 
OF THE RED CROSS 69 (2009); Jelena Pejic, Status of Armed Conflicts, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE ICRC STUDY ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & 
Susan Breau eds., 2007).  
6. On the Estonian and Georgian cases, see generally ENEKEN TIKK, KADRI KASKA 
& LIIS VIHUL, INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS (2010). 
7. See, e.g., Geoffrey Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Armed Conflict: The 
Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VANDERBILT TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL 295 (2006); Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, Untying the Gordian Knot: A 
Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on Terror, 81 TEMPLE LAW 
REVIEW 787 (2008); Geoffrey S. Corn, Making the Case for Conflict Bifurcation in Afghanistan, 
in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 181 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2009) 
(Vol. 85, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). For a well-reasoned piece 
suggesting a category of “extra-State” armed conflict, see Roy Schondorf, Extra-State 
Armed Conflict: Is There a Need for a New Legal Regime?, 37 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS 1 (2004). The International Committee of the 
Red Cross has correctly rejected the notion of armed conflicts that are other than interna-
tional and non-international. International Committee of the Red Cross, How is the Term 
“Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law? (Mar. 2008), http://www.icrc.org 
/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf. 
8. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 
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been silent as to the conditions under which they applied. They merely as-
sumed the existence of a “war.” 
Lassa Oppenheim set forth the classic definition of war in his 1906 
treatise International Law: “War is a contention between two or more States 
through their armed forces, for the purpose of overpowering each other 
and imposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases.”9 The critical 
element in the definition was that war must be between States. Intra-State 
conflict was principally a matter of domestic concern unless it rose to the 
level of a “belligerency.”10 Only then, and only because the conflict now 
resembled inter-State hostilities, did the law of war attach. 
Oppenheim’s definition implied that the existence of a war was a ques-
tion of fact. The undeclared 1905 war between Japan and Russia brought 
this approach into question. In response to the conflict, the 1907 Second 
Hague Peace Conference adopted Hague Convention III relative to the 
Opening of Hostilities. In that instrument, State parties agreed that “hostili-
ties between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit 
warning, in the form either of a declaration of war, giving reasons, or of an 
ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.”11 Consequently, a failure to 
declare war or the non-recognition of a state of war by a party to the con-
flict precluded application of treaties governing the conduct of hostilities.  
Subsequent events discredited this formalistic approach. The Spanish 
Civil War illustrated the extent to which fratricidal violence could match 
that which occurred during inter-State conflict,12 while the carnage of the 
Second World War highlighted the risk of leaving humanitarian law to the 
mercy of political decisions as to whether to declare war. Sensitive to these 
realities, the international community took a different tack in the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions. The approach taken in those instruments, which recog-
                                                                                                                      
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC I–IV respectively].  
9. LASSA OPPENHEIM, II INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 56 (1906).  
10. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 15.1.2 (2004). On belligerency, see Yair M. Lootsteen, The Concept of 
Belligerency in International Law, 166 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 109 (2000). 
11. Convention No. III Relative to the Opening of Hostilities art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2259, T.S. No. 538, 1 Bevans 619. 
12. Interestingly, parties to that conflict occasionally agreed to apply the norms set 
forth in the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. See Frédéric Siordet, The Gene-
va Conventions and Civil War, in III INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS (Supp. to 
Nos. 8, 9 & 11) (Aug., Sept. & Nov. 1950). 
 
 
 
Classification of Cyber Conflict Vol. 89 
 
237 
 
 
 
 
 
 
nizes war in both the technical and material sense, has since matured into 
customary international law.13 
The Geneva Conventions adopt a bifurcated scheme in Articles 2 and 
3, which are “Common” to all four conventions. Common Article 2 sets 
forth the standard for international armed conflict. It provides that “the 
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Con-
tracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of 
them.”14 Reduced to basics, there are two key factual criteria for interna-
tional armed conflict—a confrontation between States and hostilities that 
amount to “armed” conflict. 
In 1949, Common Article 3 signaled a sea change in the international 
community’s attitude towards internal conflagrations, for it represented the 
first lex scripta expressly applicable to non-international armed conflicts. By 
its terms, the article applies to an “armed conflict not of an international 
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” 
As with Article 2, an armed conflict is a condition precedent to applicabil-
ity, although the article does not address the nature of such a conflict in the 
non-international context. One point is clear, though. Given Common Ar-
ticle 2, a non-international armed conflict cannot involve hostilities be-
tween two or more States. Its applicability is resultantly limited to conflicts 
between a State and an armed group or those in which multiple armed 
groups are fighting each other. 
In light of the many post-1949 conflicts, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) convened a Diplomatic Conference between 1973 
and 1977 to “update” international humanitarian law. The Conference 
adopted two Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Additional Pro-
tocol I addresses international armed conflict by reference to Article 2 of 
the 1949 Conventions.15 Controversially, it also reaches “armed conflicts in 
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupa-
                                                                                                                      
13. For instance, guidance issued by States to their armed forces typically adopts this 
approach. See, e.g., U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps & U.S. Coast Guard, NWP 1-
14M/MCWP 5-12/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of 
Naval Operations ¶¶ 5.1.2.1 & 5.1.2.2 (2007). On the notion of “war,” see YORAM DIN-
STEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 3–15 (4th ed. 2005). 
14. GC I-IV, supra note 8, Common art. 2. The article also extends applicability of the 
Conventions to occupation, even when uncontested. 
15. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 1(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3.  
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tion and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination.”16 Numerous States, most notably the United States, refused 
to become party to the instrument, in part due to this latter provision.17  
Additional Protocol II applies to non-international armed conflicts. 
However, it sets a higher threshold of applicability than Common Article 
3’s naked reference to armed conflict that is not international. By Article 1, 
Protocol II applies 
 
to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of [Additional 
Protocol I] and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting 
Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other orga-
nized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such 
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained 
and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.18 
 
The provision differs from Common Article 3 in its requirement that 
dissident or other armed forces control territory and its limitation to con-
flicts involving a State, thereby excluding non-international armed conflicts 
between organized armed groups. Importantly, Article 1 specifically ex-
cludes “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, iso-
lated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not 
being armed conflicts” from the ambit of non-international armed con-
flict.19 This exclusion has been broadly accepted as reflective of customary 
international law in all non-international armed conflicts, a fact evidenced 
by its adoption in the Statute of the International Criminal Court.20 
Taken together, this collage of provisions envisions four categories of 
conflict: 1) international armed conflict between States; 2) international 
                                                                                                                      
16. Id., art. 1(4). 
17. INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY 
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER AND SCHOOL, LAW OF WAR DOCUMEN-
TARY SUPPLEMENT 232 (2011). See also Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the 
Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 419 
(1987). 
18. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts art. 1(1), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. 
19. Id., art. 1(2).  
20. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8.2(d), July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90. The statute is not limited to conflicts that meet the Additional Protocol II 
threshold. 
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armed conflict involving national liberation movements; 3) non-
international armed conflict between a State and an organized armed group 
or between organized armed groups; and 4) non-international armed con-
flict at the Additional Protocol II level. The second and fourth categories 
are relevant only to application of Additional Protocols I and II respective-
ly for Parties thereto. The first and third are acknowledged as customary 
categories of conflict. 
 
III. INTERNATIONAL ARMED CYBER CONFLICT 
 
As noted, international armed conflicts must be both “armed” and “inter-
national.” The first criterion presents the quandary that cyber operations 
are not kinetic in nature and do not employ what would in common usage 
be considered as “weapons.” At first glance, a conflict consisting of only 
cyber operations would, therefore, appear not to be “armed.” Such a con-
clusion would be incongruous for cyber operations can have highly de-
structive, even deadly, results. A State involved in an exchange of cyber 
attacks at this level would be very likely to characterize the situation as in-
ternational armed conflict, much as it would if it fell victim of another 
State’s non-kinetic bacteriological attack.  
The official ICRC Commentary to Article 2 provides that  
 
any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention 
of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning 
of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of 
war. It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, how much 
slaughter takes place, or how numerous are the participating forces.21 
 
The ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I is in accord:  
 
[H]umanitarian law . . . covers any dispute between two States involving 
the use of their armed forces. Neither the duration of the conflict, nor its 
                                                                                                                      
21. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF 
PRISONERS OF WAR 23 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter GC III COMMENTARY]. See also 
Dietrich Schindler, The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva Conventions and 
Protocols, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 131 
(1979). But see Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 37, 48 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 
2009). 
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intensity, play a role: the law must be applied to the fullest extent required 
by the situation of the persons and the objects protected by it.22  
 
Adopting the same approach, the ICTY has defined armed conflict as 
the “resort to armed force between States” without recognizing any 
threshold for the duration or intensity of hostilities.23  
By these standards, the concept of armed conflict implies forceful acts 
at whatever level.24 A fortiori, any cyber operation that amounts to an “at-
tack” in international humanitarian law terms would qualify as armed. Arti-
cle 49(1) of Additional Protocol I defines attacks as “acts of violence 
against the adversary, whether in offence or defence.” Although cyber op-
erations are not violent in themselves, they can nonetheless generate vio-
lent consequences. To the extent that they result in injury or death of per-
sons or damage or destruction of property, they are attacks satisfying the 
armed criterion of armed conflict.25 For instance, if a State was behind the 
2010 “Stuxnet” attack against supervisory control and data acquisition sys-
tems upon which the power centrifuges at an Iranian nuclear power plant 
depended, it would meet this threshold because physical damage resulted.26  
                                                                                                                      
22. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 62 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1988) [hereinafter AP COMMENTARY].  
23. Tadić Decision on Defence Motion, supra note 2, ¶ 70. 
24. It should be noted that an armed conflict can exist even in the absence of uses of 
force. For instance, Common Article 2 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions extends to 
“all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if 
the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.”  
25. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello, in INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 89, 92–94 (Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo & 
Daria P. Wollschlaeger eds., 2011) (Vol. 87, U.S. Naval War College International Law 
Studies). It has been suggested that operations falling below the threshold may also quali-
fy. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT 31IC/11/5.1.2, INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CON-
FLICTS 37 (2011) [hereinafter ICRC REPORT]; Knut Dörmann, Applicability of the Additional 
Protocols to Computer Network Attacks 6 (Nov. 19, 2004), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets 
/files/other/applicabilityofihltocna.pdf (paper delivered at the International Expert Con-
ference on Computer Network Attacks and the Applicability of International Humanitari-
an Law, Stockholm). The issue is addressed at length in the TALLINN MANUAL ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013). The author is 
grateful to his colleagues on the project leading to the Manual for their insights, many of 
which find reflection in this article. 
26. The question remains as to whether a State was behind the operation. 
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But might a cyber operation by one State against another that does not 
cause physical injury or damage nevertheless initiate an armed conflict? The 
ICRC has taken the position that a cyber operation that “disables” an ob-
ject is also an attack even when it does not cause physical damage.27 This is 
a reasonable extension of the notion of damage, at least to the extent repair 
(as distinct from merely reloading software) of the cyber infrastructure 
concerned is necessitated. Since the operation is an attack, it is also armed 
in terms of qualification for armed conflict. That said, a de minimis standard 
should attach. In much the same way that a soldier throwing a rock across 
the border does not propel the States concerned into international armed 
conflict, it would not suffice, for instance, to merely disable a single com-
puter that performs non-essential functions. 
Beyond these cases, it is unclear where State practice will lead. Consider 
a situation in which a State takes control of critical infrastructure in another 
State, conducts denial-of-service attacks against essential societal services, 
or begins deleting or changing data in a manner that severely disrupts an-
other State’s economy. As perceptively noted by the ICRC, “[i]t would ap-
pear that the answer to these questions will probably be determined in a 
definite manner only through future state practice.”28 
 In addition to being armed, cyber attacks must be of an “international” 
nature to qualify as international armed conflict. The term international 
denotes actions conducted by, or attributable to, a State. By the plain text 
of the provisions cited above, those conducted by a State’s armed forces 
qualify. Although not mentioned in those provisions, it is beyond dispute 
that cyber attacks conducted by other organs of a State, such as intelligence 
or law enforcement agencies, also qualify.29  
As noted by the ICTY in Tadić, “private individuals acting within the 
framework of, or in connection with, armed forces, or in collusion with 
                                                                                                                      
27. ICRC REPORT, supra note 25, at 37. 
28. Id. 
29. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. 
of the Int'l L. Comm'n, 53d Sess., GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. DOC. A/56/10 
(2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 32, 
U.N. DOC. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Articles of State Responsi-
bility]. Article 4(2) of the Articles of State Responsibility provides that an “organ includes 
any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the 
State.”  
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State authorities may be regarded as de facto State organs.”30 Any cyber 
attacks they launch would be treated as if launched by de jure State organs. 
Cyber attacks carried out by a person or entity that, although not an organ 
of the State, is “empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of 
the governmental authority . . . provided the person or entity is acting in 
that capacity in the particular instance” would likewise suffice.31 An exam-
ple would be a private corporation that a State authorizes by law to con-
duct cyber operations on its behalf, so long as the operations in question 
are of the sort for which said authorization was granted.  
More problematic in terms of qualifying as international are activities 
engaged in by individuals or groups that are neither organs of a State nor 
authorized to act on its behalf. It appears clear that cyber attacks by indi-
viduals or groups acting sua sponte are generally not attributable to a State 
for the purpose of finding an international armed conflict. The classic ex-
ample is the “hacktivist” cyber campaign against Estonia in 2007 (moreo-
ver, they were not “armed”).32 However, if a State endorses and encourages 
the perpetuation of the cyber operations, the individuals or groups in-
volved will be deemed “de facto organs” of the State, such that the activity 
meets the international criterion. This principle was enunciated (albeit, in 
the State responsibility context) by the International Court of Justice in the 
Hostages case and cited with approval by the ICTY in Tadić when dealing 
with attribution for the purposes of conflict classification.33  
Consider, for example, a case in which a group of one State’s nationals 
conduct cyber attacks against another State. If the government of the first 
State announces its approval of the attacks and takes steps to perpetuate 
the attacks, as in the case of establishing cyber defense mechanisms that 
preserve the group’s ability to continue its attacks, the group becomes a de 
facto State organ even if that State did not originally provide direction to the 
group.  
A scenario in which some relationship exists between a State and the 
individuals or group conducting the cyber attacks is more likely. The ICTY 
                                                                                                                      
30. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 144 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadić Appeals 
Chamber Judgment].  
31. Articles of State Responsibility, supra note 29, art. 5. 
32. See generally the discussion of these incidents in TIKK, KASKA & VIHUL, supra 
note 6. 
33. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 
3, ¶ 74 (May 24); Tadić Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 30, ¶¶ 133–37. 
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addressed this situation head on in Tadić when assessing whether the con-
flict in Bosnia-Hercegovina was international by virtue of the relationship 
between the Bosnian Serb armed groups and the Serb-dominated Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. In an often-overlooked distinction, the Tribunal 
took different approaches to the actions of organized armed groups (de-
fined below) and individuals.  
As to the former, the ICTY held that the correct threshold was one of 
“overall control going beyond the mere financing and equipping of such 
forces and involving also participation in the planning and supervision of 
military operations.”34 The issuance of specific orders or instructions relat-
ing to a single operation is not required. To illustrate, a State that exercises 
control over a group sufficient to allow it to direct the group to mount (or 
to desist from mounting) a broad campaign of cyber attacks exercises over-
all control. Similarly, if a State instructs the group to attack, or refrain from 
attacking, a particular category of cyber targets (as distinct from specific 
targets), it enjoys overall control of the group. But note the Tribunal’s men-
tion of equipping the group. Merely providing software or hardware with 
which attacks are conducted does not suffice to attribute a group’s actions 
to the State for the purpose of finding an international armed conflict (alt-
hough such assistance may violate certain norms of international law).  
The requisite degree of control over the actions of individuals who 
conduct cyber attacks without being members of an organized armed 
group is much higher. In such cases, the State must issue “specific instruc-
tions or directives aimed at the commission of specific acts” before attribu-
tion of the acts to the State for the purpose of classifying the conflict as 
international occurs.35 Absent such instructions, the attacks cannot be at-
tributed to the State for that purpose. Neither would the conflict be non-
international since, as will be discussed, the individuals do not comprise an 
organized armed group. 
                                                                                                                      
34. Tadić Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 30, ¶ 145. See also Lubanga, where 
the International Criminal Court described overall control as “a role in organising, co-
ordinating, or planning the military actions of the military group.” Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 211 (ICC Jan. 29, 
2007) [hereinafter Lubanga]. In the Genocide case, the International Court of Justice ob-
served that the overall control test “may well be . . . applicable and suitable.” Case Con-
cerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. and Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 404 (Feb. 
26).  
35. Tadić Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 30, ¶ 132. 
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Should a State permit cyber attacks to take place from its territory, it 
may be in breach of its international legal obligation to “police” its territory 
in order to ensure it is not used for purposes harming other States.36 Yet, 
its tolerance of the attacks does not satisfy the international criterion un-
less, as mentioned, the State goes further. It is irrelevant whether the at-
tacks in question are mounted by a single individual or, as in the Estonian 
case, hundreds of persons. 
Finally, it is sometimes questioned whether attribution to a State is re-
quired at all for qualification as an international armed conflict. In the Tar-
geted Killing case, the Israeli Supreme Court argued that attribution is not 
necessary so long as the group in question operates transnationally, that is, 
the conflict “crosses the borders of the state.”37 In the cyber context, this 
situation is highly probable, for organized armed groups might well launch 
cyber attacks from relative safety abroad. The U.S. Supreme Court took a 
contrary approach in Hamdan, where it found that the conflict with the Al-
Qaeda terrorist organization was “not of an international character” be-
cause it was not between States.38 In light of the earlier discussion, the U.S. 
position on this particular point is better reasoned. 
  
IV. NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CYBER CONFLICT 
 
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions defines non-international 
armed conflicts in the negative as those that are “not of an international 
character.”39 The ICTY has further developed the notion of non-
international conflict. In Tadić, the Tribunal described such conflicts as 
“protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and orga-
                                                                                                                      
36. The International Court of Justice affirmed this principle in its first case, Corfu 
Channel. The Court held that every State has an “obligation to not allow knowingly its ter-
ritory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.” Corfu Channel (U.K. v. 
Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9). 
37. Public Committee against Torture in Israel, supra note 3, ¶ 18. 
38. Hamdan, supra note 3, 628–32 (2006). 
39. GC I–IV, supra note 8, Common art. 3 (“In the case of armed conflict not of an 
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, 
each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions. 
. . .”). Only States can be High Contracting Parties. On non-international armed conflict 
generally, see ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2010); EVE LA HAYE, WAR CRIMES 
IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICTS (2008); LINDSAY MOIR, THE LAW OF INTERNAL ARMED 
CONFLICT (2002). 
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nized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”40 The equiva-
lent definition has been adopted by international tribunals and in the Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court.41 Additional Protocol II also refers 
to a conflict between a State’s armed forces “and dissident armed forces or 
other organized armed groups.” Accordingly, two essential criteria apply 
for all non-international armed conflicts—participation by an organized 
armed group and a particular level of intensity. 
Organized armed groups must be both “organized” and “armed.” 
Common Article 3 refers to “parties to a conflict,” a reference that serves 
as the source of the organization requirement. In considering this require-
ment, the ICTY has noted  
 
some degree of organisation by the parties will suffice to establish the ex-
istence of an armed conflict. This degree need not be the same as that re-
quired for establishing the responsibility of superiors for the acts of their 
subordinates within the organization, as no determination of individual 
criminal responsibility is intended under this provision of the Statute.42  
 
But the group must nevertheless be organized. Organization allows for 
acting in a coordinated manner, thereby generally heightening the capability 
to engage in violence. In military operations, such coordination typically 
involves mission planning, sharing intelligence, and exercising command 
and control. In other words, the organization criterion implies that the ac-
tions are best understood as those of a group and not its individual mem-
bers. This structural requirement is fundamental, for absent structure there 
is no identifiable enemy to treat as the other party to the conflict.43  
Whether a group is organized is always a fact and context specific de-
termination. In Limaj, the ICTY looked to such factors as, inter alia, the ex-
istence of a formal command structure, the creation of unit zones of opera-
                                                                                                                      
40. Tadić Decision on Defence Motion, supra note 2, ¶ 70. 
41. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 619 (Sept. 2, 1998); 
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment, ¶ 92 (Dec. 6, 1999); Prosecu-
tor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR73, Decision on Appeal Against “Decision on 
Prosecution’s Motion for Judicial Notice and Admission of Evidence,” ¶ 32 (May 16, 
2005) (Robertson, J., separate opinion); Lubanga, supra note 34, ¶ 233; Prosecutor v. Bem-
ba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 229 
(June 15, 2006); Rome Statute, supra note 20, art. 8(2)(f).  
42. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶ 89 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
the former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Limaj].  
43. For instance, in order to open termination of conflict negotiations. 
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tion, the issuance of orders, the establishment of a headquarters and the 
promulgation of disciplinary orders to find that the Kosovo Liberation 
Army qualified as an organized armed group in its conflict with the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia.44 
What is clear is that individuals acting alone that conduct cyber attacks 
against a State (or a particular armed group) cannot meet the organized cri-
terion. For example, despite the number of hacktivists involved in the 
cyber operations against Estonia, they lacked the requisite degree of organ-
ization and therefore the operations did not amount to non-international 
armed conflict. Similarly, consider a case in which a website containing 
malware and listing potential cyber targets is accessed by large numbers of 
individuals who are unaffiliated with the creator of the website. Those indi-
viduals who do so do not qualify as an organized armed group; they lack 
the requisite structure. When cyber attacks are merely collective in the 
sense of occurring in parallel, they are not organized. 
Cyber attacks conducted by a group that organizes entirely on-line are 
more difficult to classify. The members of virtual organizations may never 
meet nor even know each other’s actual identity. Nevertheless, such groups 
can act in a coordinated manner against the government (or an organized 
armed group), take orders from a virtual leadership and be highly orga-
nized. For example, one element of the group might be tasked to identify 
vulnerabilities in target systems, a second might develop malware to exploit 
those vulnerabilities, a third might conduct the operations and a fourth 
might maintain cyber defenses against counter-attacks.  
 The primary obstacle to characterization of the group as organized 
would be its inability to enforce compliance with international humanitari-
an law. Additional Protocol II imposes a requirement that a group be “un-
der responsible command” before a non-international armed conflict cov-
ered by the instrument exists.45 This requirement should not be interpreted 
too strictly. As noted in the ICRC Commentary to the article, the term 
 
implies some degree of organization of the insurgent armed group or dis-
sident armed forces, but this does not necessarily mean that there is a hi-
erarchical system of military organization similar to that of regular armed 
forces. It means an organization capable, on the one hand, of planning 
                                                                                                                      
44. Limaj, supra note 42, ¶¶ 94–129. 
45. AP II, supra note 18, art. 1(1). 
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and carrying out sustained and concerted military operations, and on the 
other, of imposing discipline in the name of a de facto authority.46 
 
In a virtually organized group, the requirement of an ability to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations could be met to the extent that 
cyber operations are equated with military operations, which, as discussed, 
is the case. However, imposing discipline would be difficult since the group 
lacks physical control over its members.  
Complicating matters is Additional Protocol II’s requirement that the 
group be able “to implement this Protocol.” 47 The phrase is generally un-
derstood as an ability to comply with and enforce international humanitari-
an law. Before violence can qualify as a Protocol II conflict, “the parties 
may reasonably be expected to apply the rules developed in the Protocol, 
since they have the minimum infrastructure required therefor.”48 While 
there is no requirement that the law actually be enforced, the group must 
be organized so as to enable enforcement. In a virtually organized group, 
such organization is lacking since there is no physical connection between 
the members. 
It must be cautioned that since this treaty law requirement derives from 
Additional Protocol II, it is only applicable in and of itself to conflicts in 
which that instrument applies. Common Article 3 contains no equivalent 
condition, thereby raising the question of whether an analogous customary 
law norm applies to conflicts other than Additional Protocol II non-
international armed conflicts. In this regard, the commentary to Article 3 
notes that the Diplomatic Conference that drafted the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions considered setting express preconditions for such conflicts. Alt-
hough the proposal was rejected, the Commentary asserts that they “consti-
tute convenient criteria.”49 The first condition was that the “Party in revolt 
against the de jure Government possesses an organized military force, an 
authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate territory and 
having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention.”50 
It would appear reasonable, therefore, to extend the Additional Protocol II 
requirements regarding responsible command (vis-à-vis enforcing disci-
                                                                                                                      
46. AP COMMENTARY, supra note 22, ¶ 4663.  
47. AP II, supra note 18, art. 1(1).  
48. AP COMMENTARY, supra note 22, ¶ 4470. 
49. COMMENTARY ON GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE 
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 49 (Jean 
Pictet ed., 1952).  
50. Id. 
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pline) and an ability to implement international humanitarian law to all 
non-international armed conflicts. The ICTY adopted this approach in 
Boskoski51 and it is consistent with the principle of command responsibility 
in non-international armed conflicts.52 If valid, the extension to all non-
international armed conflicts would preclude virtually organized groups 
from qualifying as organized armed groups for the purpose of classifying a 
conflict as non-international.  
In addition to being organized, the group in question must be armed. 
The meaning of armed in the non-international armed conflict context par-
allels that attending international armed conflict. As discussed, it generally 
presumes the conduct of “attacks.” Yet, since non-international armed 
conflict is premised on the activities of a group, as distinct from a State, the 
question of attribution of an individual member’s conduct to the group as a 
whole arises. Since it is the group that must be armed, the group itself must 
have a purpose of carrying out armed activities. If individual members of 
an organized group carry out cyber attacks on their own accord, that is, not 
on behalf of the group, the group does not meet the armed criterion.  
In contradistinction to international armed conflict, non-international 
armed conflict entails a certain degree of intensity. Recall that riots, civil 
disturbances, or isolated and sporadic acts of violence do not suffice; the 
hostilities must also be protracted. Decisions of the ICTY have cited such 
factors as the gravity of the attacks, the collective character of the hostili-
ties, the need to increase forces to deal with the situation, the time over 
which the hostilities have taken place, and whether the United Nations Se-
curity Council has addressed the matter as bearing on whether the intensity 
threshold is satisfied.53 However, no bright-line intensity test exists, nor is 
there any clear standard for “protracted” conflict.54 In light of the manner 
                                                                                                                      
51. Prosecutor v. Boskoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 205 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008). 
52. Although responsible command and command responsibility are separate legal 
concepts, it would be illogical to impose command responsibility on an individual for the 
actions of individuals who are members of a group that are not under responsible com-
mand; the concepts are therefore different, but related. On the issue, see Prosecutor v. 
Hadzihazanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Appeals Chamber Decision on Interlocutory 
Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command Responsibility, ¶¶ 16–22 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia July 16, 2003). 
53. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 49 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (summarizing various indicative factors). 
54. In Abella, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights characterized a thir-
ty-hour clash between dissident armed forces and the Argentinian military as non-
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in which cyber campaigns are mounted, it must be noted that although 
cyber attacks have to be frequent enough to be considered related, they 
clearly do not have to be continuous.  
This is a high threshold that would preclude many cyber operations 
from sufficing for the purpose of finding a non-international armed con-
flict. Even highly destructive cyber attacks would fail to qualify unless they 
occurred on a regular basis over time. They would instead be addressed 
within the criminal law paradigm and be governed internationally by hu-
man rights, not humanitarian, law.  
 One issue that is somewhat murky is the classification status of cyber 
attacks conducted by an organized armed group during an international 
armed conflict between two States. It is clear that if a group “belongs to” a 
party to the conflict, the conflict remains wholly international in character. 
The concept of belonging to, which stems from Article 4 of Geneva Con-
vention III, implies at least some de facto relationship between the group 
and a State that is a party.55 The article’s commentary suggests that even 
tacit agreement is sufficient so long as it is clear for which side the group is 
fighting.56  
Much more complicated is the situation in which a group engages in 
cyber attacks without doing so on behalf of one of the parties to an inter-
national armed conflict. This is not a remote hypothetical. For instance, 
when the conflict in Iraq was still international in character, organized 
armed groups lacking any connection with the Baathist regime attacked 
coalition forces. The groups, such as the Shia militia, were opposed to both 
sides during that conflict. An analogous situation could easily arise in which 
a group mounts cyber attacks against a party sua sponte. 
The ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hos-
tilities addresses such situations. It contends that “organized armed groups 
operating within the broader context of an international armed conflict 
without belonging to a party to that conflict could still be regarded as par-
ties to a separate non-international armed conflict.”57 Some participants in 
the expert process that resulted in the Guidance rejected the ICRC’s position 
                                                                                                                      
international armed conflict. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 55/97, OEA\Ser.L\V\II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶¶ 148, 327 (1998). 
55. GC III, supra note 8, art. 4A(2). 
56. GC III COMMENTARY, supra note 21, at 57.  
57. NILS MELZER, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE 
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW 24 (2009).  
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on the basis that it would prove problematic in practice because it requires 
application of the law of both international and of non-international armed 
conflict in the same battlespace.58 In their view, it was more appropriate to 
ask whether an unambiguous nexus existed between the actions of the 
group in question and the international armed conflict, rather than any par-
ty thereto. For instance, an organized armed group might conduct cyber 
attacks against an occupying force because of religious or political opposi-
tion to the occupants, not to expel them on behalf of the government. The 
requisite nexus between the group and the conflict would be their opposi-
tion to the occupation. In such a case, the conflict would remain entirely 
international irrespective of the lack of a relationship between the group 
and the occupied State.  
Finally, recall that Additional Protocol II only applies when organized 
armed groups control territory. Since a group cannot control territory 
without physical presence, the instrument is generally thought to be inap-
plicable to cyber-only conflicts. It would accordingly only apply to cyber 
operations in those Additional Protocol II conflicts involving an organized 
armed group that controls territory and conducts such operations. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
To date, States have refrained from characterizing any cyber operations 
conducted outside the context of an on-going armed conflict as either in-
ternational or non-international armed conflict. Be that as it may, cyber op-
erations will in the future inevitably present difficult conflict classification 
challenges for States. With regard to international armed conflict, attribu-
tion of cyber operations conducted by non-State actors will likely prove 
even more problematic than the attribution to States of kinetic actions has 
been in the past. In the context of non-international armed conflict, quali-
fication as an organized armed group will prove increasingly complex as 
the structures, means and prevalence of virtual organization grow and 
evolve. Perhaps most importantly, the approach taken in this article to the 
interpretation of the term “armed” is, although presently reflecting lex lata, 
unlikely to survive. With States and non-State actors engaging in ever more 
destructive and disruptive cyber operations and societies becoming deeply 
dependent on the cyber infrastructure, State practice accompanied by opinio 
juris can be expected to result in a lowering of the current threshold. The 
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law of cyber armed conflict is a work in progress and will remain so for the 
immediate future.  
